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Abstract 
Government reforms such as contracting-out continue to influence public service 
provision within infrastructure sectors. Contracting-out involves a detachment of the 
operators from political decision-making and the creation of intermediary procurement 
agencies. These reforms therefore tend to require an adaptation of how accountability is 
implemented. Previously, elected officials delegated their democratic authority (vested in 
them through public votes) to the public administration and thus more or less controlled 
service delivery. We address how accountability has been adapted in the context of 
contracting-out and the challenges that have emerged. We are primarily interested in 
assessing the ability of the political body to maintain control and the relationship between 
private service providers, citizens and customers. Using a multiple case study design, we 
select cases from the public transport sectors at the regional level in Sweden, Norway and 
Switzerland that represent different contracting-out models. We find that with increasing 
degrees of autonomy from the state (the two Nordic cases) there are both more 
adaptations to accountability and also more challenges emerge than the model with direct 
political control (the Swiss case). The central challenges arise between political-
administrative and agency accountability with the involvement of a procurement agency. 
This has led to reforms to re-integrate the intermediary procurement agencies back into 
the country administration. 
 
Introduction 
Local and regional governments have undergone widespread reforms in relation 
to the degree of hands-on control politicians have over public service 
provision. Government contracting involves a “shift in the locus of control”  
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(Romzek and Johnston 2005, p. 437): a detachment of the operators from 
political bodies and the creation of intermediary agencies. Government reforms 
involving contracting-out thus tend to require an adaptation of how 
accountability is implemented (Romzek 2014). Previously, elected officials 
controlled service delivery by delegating their democratic authority to the public 
administration (Pierre 2009). Devolution and contracting-out open up 
possibilities for alternative modes or amendments of accountability (Lodge and 
Stirton 2010). In the context of reforms, scholars have documented the changes 
in accountability relationships since the end of the last century (see Hodge and 
Coghill 2007 for a review).  
“Accountability [continues to be] spread between multiple actors and 
institutions” in the context of government reforms (Hodge and Coghill 2007, p. 
678). A central question is thus, how accountability becomes adapted in different 
contracting models. While Hodge and Coghill (2007) provide a review of 
accountability in the privatised state, our focus is on accountability adaptations in 
the space between the public and the private state. We assess different governance  
involving contracting-out with resultant competition. We are primarily interested 
in assessing the ability of the political body to be in control and the relationship 
between the operators, citizens and customers. We consequently do not focus on 
privatisation of infrastructures, but rather on different forms of autonomy that the 
operators have from the political system, while remaining predominantly in the 
control of the state. This might lead to tensions or challenges in relation to 
accountability as differing modes of accountability might conflict or compete 
with each other and certain modes might become weakened (Benz and 
Papadopoulos 2006, Hodge and Coghill 2007, Schillemans 2016). We thus 
address the questions of how accountability has been adapted in the context of 
contracting-out and what challenges emerge in relation to accountability.  
To this end, we study cases of contracting-out with ensuing competition 
from the public transport sector.  The public transport sector is a “mature” sector 
when it comes to devolution and government reform, as various forms of 
contracting-out and competition have been in place since the early 1970s 
(Alexandersson 2010, Lieberherr and Leiren 2017, Van de Velde 2005). The 
public transport sector has been largely under-theorized in policy studies 
(Saetren 2005). Studies on the interaction between multiple actors, for example 
between public servants and elected politicians in contracting processes, are 
generally difficult to find (see also the discussion in Murray 2008, Hansson and 
Holmgren 2011). Studies do exist of single actor groups, where the principal 
group studied is public officials working in the procurement entity (see for 
example Brown and Potoski 2003, Hansson 2011). While some studies do 
consider local politicians, they mainly examine the attitudes of local politicians 
towards competitive tendering (see for example Leiren 2015a, Murray 1999, 
Sørensen and Bay 2002, Hansson and Holmgren 2011). We argue that public 
transport in Norway, Sweden and Switzerland demonstrate important structural 
similarities in that they are local and regional network industries and they have 
high political relevance. These countries relate to the Neo-Weberian state model 
introduced by Pollitt and Bouckaert in 2004, which means that they have 
features of a strong state, with a regulating role and possibilities of steering 
society. The idea of political power is central; there is thus still a central role for 
representative politics in addressing the need for change (Pollit 2008). Another 
central aspect is modernization, in the sense that the state is seeking improved 
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efficiency with business-like methods, but the state remains a “distinctive actor 
with its own rules, methods, and culture” (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011, p. 22) 
Modernization also includes the state becoming more professional and 
responsive to citizens (Pollitt 2008, Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011).  
We contend that exploring these countries’ transport industries 
comparatively will produce new insights on the relationship between 
delegating responsibility, on the one hand, and accountability, on the other 
hand. Of course, there are intervening variables, such as EU (non-) 
membership, which vary across the cases. In our analysis, we find that this 
primarily plays a role with regard to the EU's Public Service Obligation (PSO) 
for Public Passenger Transport Regulation (EC 1370/2007), which is currently 
not applicable in Switzerland (non-Member of the EU), but is in Norway (a 
Member of the European Economic Area) and Sweden (EU Member State). This 
PSO influences the accountability constellation in terms of procuring via 
negotiations. It limits the alternative ways of organizing public transport, making 
competition the key rule for local public transport provision, with exceptions 
from the competition rule for «in-house» provision and specific circumstances 
(for example if the operator is a small company). 
This paper proceeds in six parts. In the next section, we outline different 
contracting-out models as well as multiple dimensions of accountability. 
Following the methods section, where we delineate our case selection, we 
present three cases of public transport sector arrangements with varying 
degrees of contracting-out. We then analyse how accountability has been 
adapted and what challenges might emerge across the cases. 
 
Contracting-out and accountability 
Government reforms and devolution in industrialized countries have led to a 
wide range of organizational arrangements for providing public services 
(Romzek 2014). Governments have particularly increased the range of services 
they deliver through contracts (Romzek and Johnston 2005). In this context, 
public service provision arrangements can range from in-house to ‘full’ 
competition in the market with various forms of contracting-out. 
A traditional in-house arrangement involves only governmental actors 
(Bovaird 2006). The public sector has the responsibility for regulating, financing 
as well as providing the service (Lundqvist 1998). .. Contracting-out has become 
a common alternative to in-house service provision (Romzek 2014). Using the 
definition of Bhatti Olsen and Pedersen (2009), contracting-out is the transfer of 
production responsibility for a publicly financed service to a private sector 
organization via procurement procedures, whereby the public sector keeps the 
overall responsibility for financing and supervising the operations. When 
shifting to a contracting regime, the roles and responsibilities between existing 
actors are often re-defined and new actor relations emerge (Romzek and 
Johnston 2005).  
Depending on the delegation structure and as shown in Figure 1, a political 
body may have direct control over the procuring procedures (model A), while in 
other cases a procurement body (model B) or the operators (model C) hold a 
larger role (Hansson 2011). Even when politicians retain dominant control, they 
make a horizontal contract with the private operator although there is no 
procurement agency (model A). A direct line from politicians to public servants 
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is in place. In cases where an external procurement agency is in charge of the 
procedures, this direct hierarchical line of control is severed (model B). 
However, the politicians may make decisions about service levels. Finally, in 
model C, there is no (in)direct tie in the case of a free market.  
 
Figure 1: Three models of contracting-out 
 
 (own representation based on text above) 
 
Such differing models of contracting-out have implications for the roles and 
responsibilities between parties and the role of the state. Within this theme lies 
the question of accountability. In contracting studies, a specific focus has been 
on procedures and mechanisms of accountability when implementing political 
goals (see for example Moe 1984, Sappington 1991, Dicke and Ott 1999, 
Hansson 2011, Girth 2014). Kelleher and Yackee (2008) have demonstrated that 
contracting-out may provide new opportunities for special interests to influence 
policymaking. As a response, governance studies scholars have argued that 
accountability is both horizontally and vertically directed and becomes more 
complex, in terms of clarifying roles and responsibilities (O´Donnell 1998, 
Greve 2008, Consindine 2002 Schillemans 2008, 2016, Romzek and Johnston 
2005, Romzek LeRoux. and Blackma .. 2012, Hansson and Longva 2014).  
We address different modes of accountability that emerge in the context of 
contracting-out and focus on the interaction between multiple actors. We 
understand accountability as a mechanism whereby actors are held to account to 
a forum, rather than as a virtue or normative good sought by actors (Bovens 
2010). As such, accountability involves mechanisms that make actors answer for 
their actions or report their performance to a given authority (Hodge and Coghill 
2007). The focus is thus on formal structures rather than informal interpersonal 
dynamics (Romzek 2014). Contracting-out has altered modes of accountability, 
spreading control mechanisms between multiple actors and institutions (Hodge 
and Coghill 2007).  
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A range of accountability models has been proposed, which sheds light onto 
the complexity of alternative modes of accountability (Hodge and Coghill 2007, 
Scott 2000, Stone 1995, Schillemans 2016). Building on an accountability 
typology developed by Hodge and Coghill (2007) we employ modes of 
accountability that differ in terms of state, market and civil society relationships, 
which are key dimensions relevant for public sector reforms (see Figure 2). 
Depending on the type of reform, in relation to the state, market or society, 
differing implications for accountability exist (see Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2: Different accountability modes (grey)  
 
(own representation based on Klenk and Lieberherr 2014). 
 
Building on Figure 2, Table 1 summarizes differing modes of accountability, 
which are explained below (the following is based on Klenk and Lieberherr 
(2014), Hodge and Coghill (2007) and Stone (1995)). Closely linked to the state 
dimension is political-administrative accountability. This has its roots in 
democratic structures and refers to intervention by politicians, ministers or 
public servants on public services via decision-making processes, hierarchical 
control or board participation (Considine 2002). Ministers are accountable for 
public actors’ and citizens’ activities within their jurisdiction (see Hodge and 
Coghill 2007). Judicial accountability addresses the development and 
application of formal rules, review of contracts and lawsuits. Market-based 
accountability refers to competition among service providers. Also under the 
market dimension, agency accountability refers to an external agency that has 
competences to monitor operators. In relation to the civil society dimension, 
constituency accountability relates to incorporating the interests of citizens for 
example via voting, representation, initiatives, referenda. Finally, customer 
accountability refers to the control that the users have on service provision 
through for example customer choice, public hearings, advisory meetings 
consumer councils. 
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Table 1: Different modes of accountability  
Mode To whom? For what? Via what 
mechanisms? 
Dimension 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Political-
administrative 
Politicians 
/Parliament and 
ministers 
Public servants/ 
public 
administration 
including for 
example 
Competition 
Authority 
 
Financial 
decisions such as 
investment as well 
as operations 
Compliance with 
administrative 
procedures and 
ultimately the law 
Board participation, 
Direct, informal 
intervention on everyday 
management 
Answering to 
parliamentary questions 
Input control (budget, 
number of staff), 
administrative mandates, 
sanctions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
State 
 
 
Judicial 
Courts 
Legislators 
Pacta sunt 
servanda 
Review of privatisation 
contracts 
Lawsuits 
 
 
Market based 
 
 
Shareholders/ 
investors 
Consumers 
Return of 
investment 
Price 
Quality and 
quantity of service 
 
 
Competition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Market 
 
 
 
 
Agency 
 
 
Agencies, audit 
institutions; 
arm’s length 
regulators 
 
 
 
Third-party 
accreditation of 
internal audit 
safety standards 
Prescribed self-evaluation 
specified performance 
measures/performance 
contracts, 
audits, benchmarking/ 
comparative competition 
based on rate of return, 
price capping 
 
 
Constituency 
 
 
Electorate 
Electing decision-
makers (or voting 
them out of 
office) 
Proposing 
alternative 
measures/actions 
 
Public voting, 
representation 
Popular initiatives, 
referenda 
 
 
 
 
Civil 
society 
 
Customer 
Consumer 
associations/ 
councils, 
Ombudsmen 
Individual 
satisfaction/ 
Grievance 
Consumer choice 
Public reporting, public 
hearings and meetings 
Price surveillance 
Source: own representation based on Klenk and Lieberherr, 2014. 
 
There is a complex interplay between the different modes of accountability. 
They may exist in parallel, overlap, be synergistic or might lead to trade-offs. 
Studies show that in the context of contracting-out, challenges in relation to 
accountability emerge particularly in terms of political-administrative 
accountability (see Hodge and Coghill 2007, Schillemans 2016). Increased 
distance between political representatives and service providers as well as the 
shift in responsibility from public to private actors and additional contractual 
relations may disrupt this line of accountability. Hence, scholars argue that in the 
context of government reforms political-administrative accountability chain can 
become weakened (Benz and Papadopoulos 2006). This may be problematic, as 
the politicians remain, at the end of the day, accountable for public service 
provision in the context of contracting-out. 
Other modes of accountability, such as agency or market-based 
accountability, may occur side-by-side with political-administrative 
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accountability, as agencies and semi-independent regulators may be in place to 
drive comparative competition and ensure compliance with performance 
contracts. This can lead to synergies, but also trade-offs. For instance, we might 
find conflicts between the different modes of accountability if the politicians 
want to retain oversight, but no longer have formal competences due to agency 
or market-based accountability or the roles between the politicians, the 
procurement agency or the regulators are unclear. Such a mixture of modes of 
accountability can undermine the effectiveness of accountability, as for instance, 
the account-holding forums become blurred and they may lack power or 
information (Johnston and Romzek 1999). 
 
Methods 
We select the public transport sector and specifically buses for our analysis, 
because the public transport sector has extensive experience with contracting-out 
(van de Velde 2005, van de Velde and Wallis 2013). Gwilliam (2008, section 9) 
provides a good overview of the historical development of contracting-out from 
an international perspective. Countries introduced competition for and in the 
market rather early in the public transport sector, compared with many other 
policy sectors. The UK was a first mover, introducing this in 1984-85. Several 
other European countries followed the UK, but with a slower reform pace or in 
sequences. The first proposal of a joint EU legislation in the form of a regulation 
of the organization of public passenger transport came in 2000, but was not 
approved until 2007 (Leiren 2015b). Hence, for a long time, no coherent EU 
regulation existed and different European countries have introduced diverse 
forms of competitive tendering in their national systems (Gwilliam 2008, van de 
Velde 2005). We have chosen cases from different countries to shed light onto 
varying contracting-out arrangements: Switzerland that is rather conservative in 
this regard and Norway and Sweden that have undergone more far-reaching 
reforms. More specifically, we choose to explore three cases in the public 
transport sector that are representative of the three contracting-out models 
presented in section 2 (see Figure 1). As such, t he cases represent different 
developments of contracting-out, involving varying degrees of control by the 
state:  
• Case 1 is representative of model A: contracting-out through 
hierarchical procedures in the regional bus sector in the region of 
Berne, Switzerland. Competitive tendering administered by the public 
department of transport, not an external procurement agency; we find a 
direct line between the politicians and the public servants. Operators are 
mostly under private law (for example in the form of joint-stock 
corporations) and most are under majority public ownership. 
• Case 2 is representative of model B: contracting-out through delegation 
to an external public agency in the bus sector in the County of 
Telemark, Norway; the hierarchical line between the politicians and the 
public servants is severed, as the county government delegated 
competitive tendering competences to an external public procurement 
agency. The operators are private. 
• Case 3 is representative of model C: contracting-out and market driven 
competition (free market) of the regional public transport in the County 
of Kalmar, Sweden; but it also contains element of model A, with de-
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agencification (return of a public agency back to the public department 
and a direct line between the politicians and the public servants). The 
operators are mainly private.  
In all three cases, the main responsibility of the service production is at the 
regional level: in Switzerland at the regional (constituent-state or cantonal) level 
and in Norway and Sweden at the county level. Hence, despite the fact that 
Switzerland is a federal state and Norway and Sweden unitary states, we are able 
to analyse the institutional strategies and accountability structures at the same 
level. In all three cases, we find the national government to have regulatory 
oversight while public transport service procurement and provision lies at the 
regional level. 
The transport sector is in flux in the countries studied. The three cases above 
are snapshots in time. The Berne case is a snapshot of how it was in 2016, the 
Norwegian case of 2012 and the Swedish case of 2013. Especially in the case of 
Telemark, Norway, it must be noted that the agency has been re-integrated into 
the county administration since 2012 (see Krogstand and Leiren 2016). However, 
the model described in this case is still a common model in Norway. What is not 
so common is to use the combination of a net contract and agency, which was 
the case in Telemark. Usually the authorities combine agency with gross 
contracts.   
Our data are primarily qualitative, including secondary research reports and 
interviews.For the Swiss case, data were collected in the autumn of 2016 and 
includes anecdotal evidence through work at the Swiss Federal Railways, as well 
as an analysis of reports and legal documents. For the Norwegian case the data 
collection is carried out related to different projects at the Institute of Transport 
Economics between 2008 and 2012. See Osland, Longva and Leiren (2008) and 
Olsen, Krogstad and Aarhaug (2012) for a detailed description of the method 
collection. The Swedish data collection was carried out between 2007-2013 and 
is related to two research projects financed by Sweden´s Innovation agency. See 
Hansson (2011) and Hansson and Longva (2014) for a detailed description of the 
method collection  
 
Adaptions of and challenges for accountability in the transport 
sector  
This section assesses the three cases in terms of the different modes of 
accountability introduced in Table 1 and emerging challenges.  
 
Berne, Switzerland: public transport department with low-level 
competition 
Public transportation in Switzerland is under a multi-level governmental 
structure. The national financial reform of 2008 defines public transport as a 
shared competence between the Confederacy and the regional governments 
(EFD 2007). The Swiss national government has the overarching control 
function, while the responsibility of public transport service procurement and 
provision lies at the regional level. The public transport sector has traditionally 
been financed by a complex system of public funds (Walter Simmen and 
Scheidegger 2005). In 1995, a reform aimed to equalize the situation for the 
operators, by adapting the availability of financial flows (Walter et al. 2005).  
Judicial accountability: Since this public transport reform, federal 
ordinances enable competitive tendering in the regional transport sectors (Walter 
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et al. 2005; Tanner 2012). The EU's Public Service Obligations (PSOs) are 
currently not eligible in Switzerland. The transport PSOs are governed by EC 
1008/2008, which is not enforced in Switzerland, but according to interview data 
the Swiss actors “feel the pressure” from these EU regulations. 
Market-based accountability: In the bus sector competitive concessions 
(called net contracts where the companies have a large economic risk, not the 
public authorities) have become widespread. In the railway sector, the 
Confederacy and the regional governments still hand out concessions to the 
operators without competition (BAV 2012). In a more recent reform (enforced 
2012), the obligations for competitive tendering have become legally defined for 
the bus sector, but not on the railway side (Tanner 2012). The regional 
government of Berne is a pioneer in tendering for bus services.  Berne has 
partnered half of all competitive tenders in Switzerland (AöV 2011). It has been 
engaging in competitive tendering in the regional bus sector since 1996 with the 
aim to improve cost-effectiveness (Walter et al. 2005, AöV 2011). However, the 
total number of competitive tendering remains rather small and incremental, as 
the sector is subject to path dependence and existing contracts (not competitively 
tendered) typically last ten years. Hence, we find limited market-based 
accountability. As of 2011 only one-third of the bus lines in Berne have been 
competitively tendered and these primarily in small bus-lines; hence the 
competitively tendered portion of public busses is ca. 15% (AöV 2011). 
Moreover, the competitive tenders involve relatively small financial amounts: an 
annual turnover of less than three million Swiss francs (AöV 2011). In addition, 
there is usually just one operator on one line and there is a pricing system for 
transport companies, defining prices in small-scale geographical zones (AöV 
2011, 2014).  
The procedure for competitive tendering occurs accordingly: the Bernese 
Parliament allocates a fixed sum for a certain level of service over a certain 
period for regional transport services. Money from the municipalities and the 
Confederation through various funds complements this sum (see AöV 2014). 
The department for public transport then opens the tendering process. It thus 
assesses the bids in relation to the fixed payment allotted for the specified 
service. The public payments cover the costs that the company does not offset 
with its proper earnings. Crucially, this public payment is fixed, so it does not 
increase when the company has fewer earnings than planned; if the company 
does not perform as projected in the bid, then the company bears the financial 
risk. Conversely, this also gives the company an incentive to reduce costs, so 
they can make a profit.  
Agency accountability: The case of Berne shows the introduction of a 
limited degree of competitive tendering without major administrative reforms, as 
no external procurement agency has been put into place for the procuring 
process. Hence, agency accountability is not applicable.  
Political-administrative accountability: According to the above tendering 
procedure, both the parliament and the executive have control over the 
contracting-out situation. Investment planning and the mid-term service-level 
planning is controlled by the parliament and the service level planning, tendering 
process, control and justification of costs, development of infrastructures, 
making of the contracts with the operators, operational planning, service level 
agreement etc. are done by the public department (federal office for transport), 
under the oversight of the political executive.  
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Constituency accountability: The citizens in Berne have the potential to use 
direct democratic tools such as referenda or initiatives, if they are unsatisfied 
with service provision, but only for aspects specified in the law. The public has 
no control over the specificities of the tendering contracts.  
Customer accountability: The customers cannot typically choose their 
service provider. However, there is a federal bureau on price surveillance, which 
can act in favour of the consumer if abusive prices have been determined in 
public transit. General consumer associations rarely deal with public transit 
pricing because of highly regulated pricing system and its complexity. 
In sum, there has been little adaptation in terms of political-administrative 
and judicial accountability in the Berne case, as these modes remain primarily 
unchanged. The case shows how national legislation enabling competitive 
tendering has not become widespread at the subnational level: the Swiss consider 
Berne a pioneer, but market-based accountability has only emerged to a limited 
degree. Also, in terms of constituency and customer-based accountability, we 
could not identify any notable adaptations in the context of competitive 
tendering, as the mechanisms in place have existed prior to this reform. 
 
Telemark, Norway: external procurement agency and competition 
Local public transport is a regional responsibility in Norway. The 19 counties 
(from 2020: 11 counties) are responsible for such services. Traditionally the 
counties have bought public transport services from private or public companies, 
negotiating costs and service levels.  
Judicial accountability: In 1994, the national government introduced a 
voluntary provision in the Vocational Transport Act, allowing the counties to 
make use of competitive tendering. Since the transposition of the PSO regulation 
into Norwegian law in 2010, procurements via negotiations are restricted. 
Today local public transport authorities have to choose between producing 
services “in house” or make use of competition.  
Market-based accountability: The above regulations have opened up for an 
increase in competitive tendering procedures and competition. In cases of 
competition, a gross contract is common. This implies that the public authorities 
or the agency is in charge of route planning and ticketing and receives the 
income from travel tickets. The economic risk for the operator is therefore 
smaller than in cases of other types of contracts such as net contracts, where the 
operators have such competence. 
Agency accountability: Simultaneous with competitive tendering, 
professional procurement agencies have increased in number since the mid-1990s 
(Leiren 2015a). This parallel development of establishing agencies is partly a 
response to the need of public transport authorities to increase their competence 
when engaging in competitive tendering procedures (Osland et al. 2008). 
 A result of such organizational changes is a double “chain” of contracts 
(Longva and Osland 2010): There is a framework agreement and a delivery 
agreement between the political body (such as the county with its politicians and 
internal administration) and the professional procurement agency; and there is a 
gross or net contract between the agency and the (private) operator. In the case 
of Telemark, the procurement agency is responsible for tactical decisions and 
possesses deeper public transport insights than the county administration. 
However, representatives of the agency experience that the county 
administration gives them (too) many tasks. Given the limited amount of 
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resources in terms of personnel, the agency experiences that it is unable to 
respond to all issues – nor is it the responsibility of the agency to respond to all 
of them. The private bus operators in Telemark are partly responsible for the 
planning of routes. However, they are interested in increased independence from 
the agency in developing the services. They therefore lobby politicians in order 
to gain more responsibilities and may address issues with the political body 
rather than the agency, which is their principal in terms of contracts. The bus 
operators therefore contribute to stirring up the debate about re-organization. 
Political-administrative accountability: In the Telemark case there has been 
a division of roles, which has led to indirect decision-making rights on the part 
of the political-administrative actors, as some county politicians are represented 
on the agency’s board. The county administration makes strategic decisions and 
coordinates public transport with other policy areas. However, when developing 
strategies and plans the county administration experiences that they lack the 
necessary transport knowledge, as they have delegated this to the agency. While 
strengthening the internal public transport expertise is a possibility, this is not 
optimal, given that it would easily create a “double” administration. The county 
administration therefore requests information from the agency. The 2011 
elections exacerbated this situation, which led to a shift in political 
representatives who were unfamiliar with the organizational arrangement and did 
not know how to manage the situation (Krogstad and Leiren 2016). They have 
expressed that they want to be involved in tactical public transport decisions to a 
larger extent than the organizational arrangement of delegation allows for.  
Constituency accountability: Direct democratic means do not play a critical 
role at the local level, but local elections (obviously) have an influence. The 
elections from 2011, for instance, shifted the political majority in the County 
Council from a right-wing to a left-wing coalition (Krogstad and Leiren 2016). 
This led to new politicians responsible for public transport who wanted to be 
more involved in tactical decisions, as discussed above.  
Customer accountability: the customers cannot choose their provider.  A 
national regulatory agency, a Competition Authority, exists to ensure fair and 
transparent competition procedures. 
This example of Telemark highlights challenges in relation to accountability 
in a context of contracting-out using a professional procurement agency. The 
politicians want to be able to govern public transport in its details, but the 
organizational model does not allow for such steering, as they have delegated 
responsibilities to both a professional procurement agency and private operators. 
It shows the difficulty of being a politician, delegating responsibilities to other 
entities, while still being accountable. At the same time, the procurement agency 
experiences difficulties, working at the interface between the operators and the 
politicians. The main modes of accountability that have been adapted in the 
Telemark case are political-administrative and agency accountability. While the 
former has decreased, as the agency rather than the politicians are the principal, 
the latter has increased. Judicial accountability appears unchanged, while 
market-based accountability has increased with competitive tendering. 
Constituency and customer accountability have not changed.  
 
Kalmar, Sweden towards de-agencification with parallel market systems 
In Sweden, the central government has a regulatory role in the public transport 
sector, while the overall responsibility of public transport services have been 
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shared between the regional and local government level. A regional transport 
authority, organized as an agency was responsible for planning regional traffic 
and the municipalities (local level) was responsible for the local traffic. 
Judicial accountability: Due to challenges with political-administrative and 
agency accountability in the context of an external procurement agency (the 
transport authority), national legislation aimed toward de-agencification at the 
subnational government level with the new Swedish law on public transport 
passed in 2010. The legislators designed the law to meet two main requirements: 
increased steering from the political level (increased political-administrative 
accountability) and increased involvement from the private sector, mainly bus 
operators. The background of the de-agencification was the large critique 
political actors and other organizations had raised against the transport 
authorities in terms of lack of transparency and possibility to influence decisions. 
By re-organizing the transport authority into a department at the county council, 
it was assumed that this would increase the possibility of political steering (SOU 
2009). The new legislation opened up for a parallel system of providing services: 
a) The county can procure public transport through competitive tendering 
(contracting-out) and b) operators can work based on free market principles.  
This is also in line with the EU Public Service Obligations for Public Passenger 
Transport Regulation. The background to this parallel system is to encourage 
free competition, as well as uphold public transport service on lines that are not 
market attractive (through contracting-out). The new Swedish law took effect in 
2012. 
Market-based accountability: Formally, the new law resulted in an opening 
for competition in the market. This means that an operator is free to establish 
new bus-lines on the existing public transport net. 
Agency accountability: The reform aimed at de-agencification. A central 
change was hence to diminish the co-owned agencies and instead integrate them 
in the county council organization (regional level). Using Kalmar as an example, 
the former agency is now a department within the county council (described 
below). 
Political-administrative accountability: The legislation also formally led to 
an institutional shift in the responsibility of public transport at the local 
government level.   The county councils were required to set up a transport plan, 
which included clear operative goals. The statistical responsibility of reporting 
transport data to the national level was extended and included in the county 
council’s responsibility (Trafikanalys 2014). However, the new organizational 
form has not given the political-administrative actors more say, as was the 
intention, but rather less.  The “new” department in Kalmar holds the same name 
and employees as when it was an agency. They work in the same office as 
before, separated from the county council offices, located in another city. The 
transport plan is written by the transport planners and then communicated to a 
transport group; consisting of six political members from the county council and 
six municipal representatives. Then the county council board approves the plan. 
Within these institutional changes, the municipalities in the county have lost the 
formal decision making rights over strategic decisions that they had when they 
owned the joint agency. Since the county consists of 12 municipalities, some 
municipalities also lack representation in the transport group. Operators that 
establish new lines based on free market principles are required to report to the 
county council 21 days prior to opening a service (Trafikanalys 2014). This 
Adapting Accountability and Emerging Challenges: Contracting-Out in the Transport Sector in Switzerland, 
Norway and Sweden 
 
 69 
means that the county council gets information from the operators, however, the 
county council has no formal control or possibility to impose incentives or 
sanctions.  
 Constituency accountability: Direct democratic means, such as referenda 
and initiatives do not play a critical role at the local level. Local elections can of 
course have an influence, but none of importance took place during the 
timeframe analysed. 
Customer accountability: In the context of opening up the market, customers 
should be able to influence the system by active choices (SOU 2009, p. 21). 
Formally, the customers can choose between different operators, and travel with 
the operator that provides best service (based on the principle of free market). 
However, in practice there are few examples of competition in the market at the 
county level. In Kalmar County, contracting agreements provide the transport 
services and no bus-line has opened in the market. The only example found is 
one bicycle ferry-line that was running during the summer period of 2014. At the 
national level a regulatory agency, a Competition Authority, exists to ensure fair 
and transparent competition procedures. Despite the new Swedish legislation 
passed in 2010 that aimed at de-agencification, the analysis indicates that not 
much has changed, besides the formal re-organization.  
In sum, political-administrative and agency accountability remain a 
challenge in the Swedish case, as the changes appear to be a “paper product” and 
implementing actors have administered the new legislation to fit the existing 
governance structures. While overall in Sweden the open market drives some 
bus lines to airports, in general public transport is still based on competitive 
tendering procedures (Trafikanalys 2014). Hence, the reform has not greatly 
affected market accountability and customer accountability has not emerged, as 
at the county level no real change toward competition in the market has taken 
hold. However, like in Norway, the Competition Authority is in place to 
safeguard fair prices. Also like in Norway, constituency accountability has not 
changed and referenda etc. do not play a critical role in this regard. However, 
free market-mechanisms would hinder citizens from shaping the bus-line system. 
 
Comparative Discussion 
The cases show varying adaptations regarding the mode of accountability with 
differing contracting-out arrangements. In Berne, Switzerland, we have 
accountability through the public transport department under direct control by 
politicians and low-level competition for the market. In Telemark, Norway, we 
find accountability with an external public procurement agency and contracting 
through competitive tendering; the politicians have delegated a degree of control 
to an external agency. Finally, in Kalmar, Sweden, de-agencification and parallel 
market systems are emerging to a limited degree, as competitive tendering 
remains predominant. While in the Swiss case, procurement can occur via 
negotiations, the EU regulation (PSO) restricts the ways of how to organize 
public transport in Sweden and Norway. Only under certain circumstances (for 
example when the operator has the economic risk), are negotiations in 
compliance with EU law that has been transposed into Norwegian and Swedish 
law. Hence, we find that the intervening factor of EU non-membership 
influences the accountability constellation. 
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In the Swiss case, there is no external public procurement agency. In the 
Norwegian case, in contrast, there was a debate (at the time of study in 2012) 
about whether to re-integrate the agency back into the public transport 
department with direct control by the politicians (now it has been re-integrated). 
Finally, such re-integration has already occurred via national law in the Swedish 
public transport case at the time of study (2013). However, as the Swedish case 
highlights, such re-integration is not always wanted and might end up being 
primarily a re-integration on paper rather than in reality: The public servants that 
used to work in the agency and are now in the public department, but remain 
separate from the “rest” of the administration. Another interesting dynamic in 
the Swedish case is the layering of free competition in the market alongside the 
existing competitive tendering regime, the same competitive tendering regime 
common in Norway. Yet, as the Swedish case highlights, the effects of this 
reform are only minor – competitive tendering remains the common procedure 
for public transport service provision.  
As shown in Table 2, the three cases have many similarities and some 
differences with regard to their modes of accountability. Overall, accountability 
has been the least adapted in the Swiss case and the most in the Swedish case, at 
least on paper.  
Traditional political-administrative accountability exists in all three cases 
albeit to varying degrees. In the Swiss case, this has been adapted the least and 
the link to the politicians is the most direct, both in terms of the legislative and 
executive branch: the legislative branch makes the financial decisions and the 
executive branch has control via the responsible public transport department 
over the planning and operational tasks. All the competences remain within the 
public transport department, under direct oversight by politicians and the citizens 
have access to initiatives and referenda. In the Norwegian case, there has been an 
adaptation where the politicians have an indirect link via political representation 
in the board of the agency. In the Swedish case, the responsibility of public 
transport has been re-situated into one political organization (the county council) 
and not delegated to an agency. In this sense, the Swedish case has similarities 
with the Swiss case. The political control in the Swedish case has been re-
adapted (a return to how it once was) in terms of bringing the transport planning 
and the procurement into one body. However, the political control has also 
weakened in terms of controlling the establishment of market-based public 
transport lines.  
In terms of control through the national government level, the Swiss case is 
subject to control by the Federal Office for Transport as well as an independent 
federal authority responsible to ensure protection (federal bureau on price 
surveillance). The Norwegian and Swedish cases both have a Competition 
Authority, which ensures fair and transparent competition procedures.  
Judicial accountability has been adapted in all cases (at least on paper), as 
we see new legislation altering the relationship between operators, agencies and 
political-administrative departments. The distinction of roles in the Norwegian 
case are clearer on paper than in real life. This is partly a consequence of 
politicians wanting more “hands on” control than the organizational arrangement 
allows for and partly lack of familiarity with the organizational arrangement 
among the politicians. In the Swedish case, attempts have been made to 
strengthen judicial accountability with the new legislation, but no real change 
could be identified. 
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The Swiss case lacks agency accountability, as there is no external agency; 
the department responsible for procurement is subject to political-administrative 
accountability. Both Nordic cases have agency accountability, with a 
professional procurement agency. In the Norwegian case, agency accountability 
has been adapted and the political body has initiated several consultants to 
evaluate and assess the governance arrangement. In the Swedish case, agency 
accountability was initially adapted with the development of external 
procurement agencies. Since then, legislators have tried to reduce agency 
accountability problems through de-agencification and increase political-
administrative accountability. This shift can also be interpreted as a stronger 
move towards a Neo-Weberian state model (compared to the new-public 
management model) in terms of trying to increase to role of political power. 
However, in practice, the former structures of delegation to agencies still exist. 
For example, the transport planners employed at the agencies still have the 
public transport expertise and thus have an informational advantage in 
comparison to the politicians.  
Market-based accountability has been adapted in all cases. In the Swiss case 
the public transport authority and in Norwegian case the public transport agency 
administer competitive tendering. If the quality is bad, the service provider might 
lose access to the market in the next competition, after the contract has ended (no 
new public transport contract awarded). Comparatively, market-based 
accountability has been adapted to a greater degree in the Norwegian case 
(Aarhaug Fearnley, Gregersen, and Norseng 2018) than the Swiss case, as in the 
latter only one-third of the bus lines have undergone competitive tendering. In 
the Swedish case, we find the strongest market-based adaptations due to a 
market opening alongside competitive tendering, at least on paper: formally, 
operators can compete freely in the market of public transport. Today, two 
parallel systems of providing public transport services exist in the Swedish case: 
competitive tendering and open market access, while the former remains 
dominant and the latter sparse. 
We find little adaptation of constituency and customer-based accountability 
in all cases. Constituency accountability is arguably the most predominant in the 
Swiss case, as the citizens have access to initiatives and referenda regarding 
issues specified in the law. In the context of contracting-out with additional 
contracts specifying performance standards constituency accountability is lower 
than if provision were in-house and only subject to public laws. Customers 
cannot choose the provider, but the federal bureau ensures fair procedures. In the 
Norwegian case, direct democratic tools are not in place, simply common 
representative democracy that aims at increasing this element of accountability 
(we find the elections to have an effect). Customer accountability is limited: 
customers cannot choose between companies, as only one company operates 
certain routes, which the company has won in competitive rounds. Hence, 
indirectly the Competition Authority can foster customer accountability. In the 
Swedish case, the reform has weakened constituency accountability, as operators 
could compete freely in the open market, reducing the citizens’ possibility to 
influence the structure of the bus-line system. Conversely, this has led to a 
strengthening of customer accountability through consumer-choice between 
competitors (at least on paper). A central argument favouring an opening up of 
the market was the consumer perspective: they should have more options of 
service providers. Similar to Norway the Competition Authority in Sweden can 
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also safeguard customer accountability. A strengthening of customer 
accountability has also occurred, as there are now more possibilities of 
transparency in the decision-making, since it is concentrated to the county 
council and citizen only need to address this political body. The information is 
also more accessible due to the statistical requirement the county council now 
has toward the national government level. 
Table 2 summarizes the results in a comparative manner. We find a layering 
of accountability with almost all modes existing in all cases: only the Swiss case 
lacks agency accountability. 
 
Table 2: Comparative summary of accountability modes across cases 
Mode Berne 
Switzerland 
Telemark 
Norway 
Kalmar 
Sweden 
Challenge Sector 
 
 
 
 
Political-
administrative 
Direct link to 
legislative and 
executive 
branch: 
financial 
decisions and 
oversight 
Federal office 
for transport 
has control 
 
Indirect link 
via political 
representation 
in the board 
of the agency 
Competition 
Authority 
Direct 
through 
county 
council, no 
longer 
delegated to 
agency 
Competition 
Authority 
Conflict between 
agency and 
political 
accountability in 
Norwegian of 
roles between 
county 
administration and 
agency in Norway 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
State 
 
 
 
 
 
Judicial  
 
 
 
 
National laws and contracts regulate the 
relationship between the involved actors 
 
In Norway 
politicians 
wanting more 
“hands on” 
control; Swedish 
case new reform 
that attempts to 
clarify roles 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Agency 
 
 
 
 
 
 
None identified 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Professional 
procurement 
agency 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Professional 
procurement 
agency 
de-
agencification 
Conflict between 
agency and 
political-
administrative 
accountability in 
Swedish case: 
challenges due to 
information 
deficits between 
the agency and the 
public servants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Market 
 
 
 
Market based  
 
Limited 
competitive 
tendering 
 
 
Competitive 
tendering 
 
Competitive 
tendering 
Market 
competition 
(on paper) 
 
 
None identified 
 
 
Constituency 
Indirect and 
Direct: 
Initiatives and 
referenda 
 
Indirect 
 
 
 
None 
identified 
 
 
 
 
Civil 
society  
 
Customer 
 
Federal bureau 
on price 
surveillance 
 
Competition 
Authority 
Consumer 
choice 
Competition 
Authority 
Source: own representation. 
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As shown in Table 2, we find challenges in relation to accountability emerging in 
the context of contracting-out and particularly in the Norwegian and Swedish 
cases. We mainly find challenges due to conflicts between political-
administrative and agency accountability: In the Norwegian case we find that 
political-administrative accountability led to a challenge in the situation with a 
procurement agency, as there was a confusion of roles, challenges with 
information and steering. The agency lacked the capacity to respond to all the 
political requests and at the same time, the agency did not formally have the 
competence to respond to all such requests, as this is the role of the county 
administration. However, this administration experienced that it was no longer 
competent enough to respond to all the details that the politicians were 
requesting. Moreover, the administration has less access to information than 
previously: with the procurement agency in place, it faced informational deficits 
between agency and politicians. A similar challenge existed previously in the 
Swedish case, before it changed to maintain the control within the county 
council: the political body was criticized for not having the power or competence 
to put pressure on the agencies. Hence, the new legislation aimed to strengthen 
political-administrative accountability. Also in the Swedish case, the 
development of external procurement agencies led to challenges due to 
information deficits between the agency and the political-administrative actors. 
Thus, legislators attempted to reduce agency accountability problems through 
de-agencification and increase political-administrative accountability. 
 
Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to study adaptations of and challenges for 
accountability in different contracting-out arrangements in the public transport 
sector. To this end, we employed multiple  modes of accountability: Political-
administrative, agency, judicial, market accountability, constituency and 
consumer-based (see Hodge and Coghill 2007, Stone 1995) and assessed these in 
three cases: Berne, Switzerland; Telemark, Norway; and Kalmar, Sweden, which 
each represent a different model of contracting-out. We found that with 
increasing detachment of the operators from political decision-making (the two 
Nordic cases) more adaptations of accountability occurred and more challenges 
for accountability emerged than the model with direct political control (the Swiss 
case). 
In the Norwegian and Swedish cases, which both have external procurement 
agencies, we find key reasons for the emergent challenges to be a conflict 
between political-administrative and agency accountability where the politicians 
1) lacked information, 2) became dependent on the agency, and 3) wanted 
increased control. This then led to confusion and difficulties to maintain clear 
accountability chains. Put differently, in both the Norwegian and the Swedish 
cases, we see several challenges in relation to accountability in terms of political 
authorities’ inability to impose power over the procurement agencies. The Swiss 
case seems to be able to avoid this, as no separate agency exists. In response to 
these challenges for accountability, both the Nordic cases undertook further 
reform toward de-agencification (re-integrated into the county administration to 
look more like the Swiss case). At the time of analysis the Norwegian process 
had only started.  
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Interestingly, we find convergence on the modes of accountability across the 
three cases assessed in this paper. The only major divergence across the cases is 
in terms of political-administrative and agency accountability. Both political-
administrative and agency accountability remain the least adapted in this Swiss 
case: political-administrative remains predominant and agency accountability 
absent. Conversely, the Nordic cases have undergone adaptations in terms of 
agency accountability. Yet interestingly this shift toward agency accountability 
in the Swedish case has led to a simultaneous shift back toward increased 
political-administrative accountability, as the external procurement agency has 
been re-integrated into the public administration, again, at least on paper in the 
Swedish case (and later also in the Norwegian case, although this was not part of 
our analysis). Hence and in contrast to the previous arguments (Benz and 
Papadopoulos 2006), we find that, contracting-out and competition do not 
necessarily decrease the political-administrative accountability chain, at least on 
paper. However, what we do see in the two cases with procurement agencies is a 
struggle for the politicians to maintain sufficient oversight and information.  
In sum, this analysis across countries brings interesting insights about the 
relationship between delegating responsibility and adapting accountability, 
where we find increased delegation to involve a complex juggling act among 
different modes of accountability, where the traditional strong role of political-
administrative accountability does not necessarily wane but may also wax. 
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